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Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the account of self-consciousness provided by Chinese Yogācārins 
Xuanzang (602-664CE) and Kuiji (632-682CE). I will explain how they clarify the transition from self-
attaching to self-emptying through the articulation of consciousness (vijñāna). Current scholarship 
often interprets the Yogācāra account of consciousness either as a science of mind or as a metaphysical 
idealism. Both interpretations are misleading, partly because they perpetuate various stereotypes about 
Buddhism, partly also because they overlook the religious goal of realizing in practice the wisdom 
of emptiness and the non-egoistic compassion. Against the status quo, I argue that through their 
account of self-consciousness, Xuanzang and Kuiji advocate what can be referred to as transcendental 
idealism that stresses the correlation between subjectivity and objectivity. Yogācārins thus neither 
nullify the existence of subjectivity nor formulate subjectivity as a higher entity. The transcendental 
idealism yields a Buddhist phenomenology that is similar to and also different from Edmund Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology. In what follows I will first characterize Husserl’s phenomenology as an 
approach to consciousness at two levels (the descriptive level and the explicative level). Then, I elicit 
the Buddhist phenomenology from Yogācāra philosophy that is not only descriptive and explicative but 
also prescriptive. This three-level architectonic of consciousness, while reaffirming the importance of 
agency, further justifies the role of religious rituals and moral practices for Yogācāra devotees.  
Keywords: phenomenology, Husserl, transcendental idealism, Chinese Yogācāra, self-consciousness 
1  Introduction 
The Yogācāra school of Buddhism is known for using the investigation of consciousness to reach the 
religious goal of realizing the wisdom of emptiness and the non-egoistic compassion. According to 
Xuanzang (602-664)1, the Chinese Yogācārin, consciousness (識，vijñāna) is defined through liao-bie 
(了别, vijñāpti).2 Xuanzang’s disciple Kuiji (632-682) further elaborates that liao-bie shows the feature 
of consciousness to transform (轉變, pariṇāma) itself into the act of knowing (liao) its distinct (bie) 
phenomenon.3 This definition raises the possibility, at least in principle, of comparing Yogācāra 
philosophy with Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938) phenomenology insofar as Husserl also characterizes 
consciousness through the relation of the intending act with the intended phenomenon, a relation 
1  All dates listed are Common Era (CE), unless otherwise noted. 
2   T31N1585, P1a.
3   T43N1830, P240c17.
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commonly known as intentionality. This paper focuses on Yogācāra philosophy and Husserl’s 
phenomenology because of their shared concern about the ultimate nature of consciousness and how 
this nature can influence our life. 
My purpose here is thus not merely to juxtapose Yogācāra with Husserl’s phenomenology or vice 
versa. Nor do I attempt to synthesize them into a new theory. Rather, following the Buddha’s teaching 
of the Middle Way, I intend to preserve a middle ground for initiating a dialogue between Yogācārins 
and Husserl. Such a method that goes beyond juxtaposition and synthetization does not lead us back 
to the starting point of comparing. Rather, it will advance our knowledge of the ultimate nature of 
consciousness. Hereby, aside from listing similarities and dissimilarities, I hope to reveal the latent 
possibility of religious philosophy in Husserl’s phenomenology on the one hand and make a case 
for Buddhist phenomenology in the Yogācāra sense on the other. This method further allows me to 
challenge current misrepresentations of the Yogācāra doctrine of consciousness. 
Existing Yogācāra scholarship offers two standard interpretations of such doctrine. Some scholars 
construe Yogācāra Buddhism as a natural science of mind,4 whereas others perpetuate the stereotype 
that Yogācārins reduce mundane reality into a stratum of illusion by conceptualizing the eighth 
consciousness qua ālaya as a transcendent entity.5 Aside from their differences, both interpretations 
depict worldviews that later Yogācārins do not endorse. They further leave an impression that the true 
Buddhism exists in its philosophical doctrines, not in practices.6 This, however, is very misleading. 
Yogācārins’ investigation of consciousness is first and foremost subservient to the religious goal of 
realizing emptiness and compassion. This teleology determines the religious character of Yogācāra 
Buddhism, that is, devotees shall first understand the Buddha’s teaching, and, then, they must faithfully 
apply their understanding to practices through which they eventually awaken the wisdom of emptiness 
and the non-egoistic compassion. Given the importance of everyday religious practice, Yogācārins do 
not endorse the scientific or nihilist worldview described by current scholars. 
To clarify the religious character of Yogācāra philosophy, I turn to the account of self-consciousness 
offered by Xuanzang and Kuiji. I bring in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to facilitate our 
understanding of the Yogācāra worldview. In what follows, I begin by characterizing Husserl’s 
phenomenology as a two-level approach to consciousness: at the descriptive level, it portrays intentional 
activities and at the explicative level, it explains the condition for the possibility of phenomena to appear in 
consciousness. Then, I continue to elucidate the conception of self-consciousness articulated by Chinese 
Yogācārins. This elucidation permits me to interpret the Yogācāra architectonic of consciousness as a 
three-level approach: descriptively, it depicts consciousnesses and their transformation; explicatively, 
it clarifies the way in which the transformation of consciousness implements the possibility for both 
forming and removing attachments; prescriptively, it establishes norms for religious practices and 
moral actions. This dialogue between Husserl and Yogācārins, as I contend in the conclusion, will 
advance our understanding of Yogācāra Buddhism and enrich our knowledge of the ultimate nature of 
consciousness.
4  For the interpretation of Buddhism as a science or philosophy, please refer to the following works. Flanagan, The Bodhisattva’s 
Brain, 79; Coseru, Perceiving Reality, 21.
5  For scholars who equate consciousness-only with ‘nothing existing but consciousness, please see the following works. 
Chatterjee, Yogācāra Idealism, 174; Wayman, “The Yogācāra Idealism”, 67; Griffiths, On Being Mindless, 82; Schmithausen, 
Ālayavijñāna, 166. Although these scholars are debating on how to define the existence of the higher entity qua ālaya, they tend 
to characterize the mundane reality as the void. 
6  Most critics attribute this tendency of prioritizing philosophy over others to Orientalism, namely, a romanization of 
Buddhism into what it is not. We can trace this Orientalist discourse from Victorian Buddhologists, among them T.W. Rhys 
Davids (1896) who envisages Buddhism as a rational philosophy, to D.T. Suzuki (1927) who characterizes Buddhism with non-
rational psychology. Recent scholarship closely scrutinizes this tendency of overlooking the practical side of Buddhism (Hori, 
“Openings”, 13). In this paper, I hope to exhibit how philosophical argumentation is interdependent with religious practices 
and historical contexts. I contend that these three aspect are equally important and mutually complementing in the Yogācāra 
doctrine of consciousness.   
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This examination of self-consciousness allows me to argue that later Yogācārins in China do not rid 
ideality of Buddhism to architect a science of mind. Nor do they purport to become nihilists who negate 
worldly reality. Rather, the continuous transformation of consciousnesses opens up the possibility 
for subjective ideality to correlate with everyday reality moment by moment. Devotees can realize this 
possibility by complying with rules for religious practices. The experience of subject-object correlation 
first yields the wisdom of emptiness and then awakes the non-egoistic compassion. 
2  Husserl’s conception of intentionality and the rejection 
of naturalism
Every day, when we open our eyes, we are immediately aware of our surroundings, such as the weather, 
the tree in front of my apartment, my room, my cat, and the pigeons on the balcony. Yet, even if we close 
our eyes and fall asleep, we continue to experience other images in dreams. Consciousness enables us to 
access various kinds of objects, some of which have the psycho-physical existence like the tree outside 
my house yet others do not, such as the unicorn in my dream. 
Modern philosopher Edmund Husserl, who engaged himself in investigating human experience, 
highlighted the intentional characteristic of consciousness that correlates mind, body, and the world. 
As I will argue in this section, Husserl’s phenomenology can be categorized as a two-level approach 
to consciousness, depicting intentional consciousness at the descriptive level while expounding 
transcendental idealism at the explicative level. This sketch of Husserl’s phenomenology first allows us 
to explore the nascence of a phenomenology of religion and then prepares us for the interpretation of 
Yogācāra philosophy in the subsequent sections. 
At the descriptive level, Husserl begins by pinpointing the defining feature of consciousness, namely, 
intentionality. Husserl’s well-known formula of intentionality goes as follows: ‘consciousness is always 
the consciousness of (something)’.7 Throughout his life, Husserl kept elaborating on his conception of 
intentionality. Here I mainly pinpoint four phases in this development. 
In Logical Investigations, Husserl defines intentionality as the characteristics of mental acts that 
always aim at an object.8 Each mental act encompasses two elements, or in Husserl’s terms, two 
inseparable moments known as quality and matter. While quality determines the genre (of the act), 
matter offers the content.9 For instance, my recollection of my cat sleeping on my lap differs from my 
dreaming that my cat was sleeping on my lap. Even though the contents remain the same, namely, my cat 
sleeping on my lap, the quality of the act demarcates my recollecting from my dreaming. Contrariwise, 
matter differentiates one recollection from other recollections. My recollection of my last family reunion 
is not the same as my recollection of my breakfast this morning insofar as the matter or the content of 
the former act of recollecting is distinct from that of the latter act. 
In the second phase, Husserl replaces this quality-matter pair with the noesis-noema dichotomy 
in Ideas 1. After performing epoché, the reduction, we move to the realm of pure consciousness. I 
will revisit Husserl’s articulation of epoché and pure consciousness soon. While noesis describes the 
subjective act of intending, noema refers to the intended phenomenon that an object appears as such in 
pure consciousness.10 
In the third phase, Husserl develops the threefold schemata called ego-cogito-cogitatum, 
complementing the noesis-noema dichotomy.11 As is documented in Inner Time Consciousness and 
Cartesian Meditations, ego serves as the absolute flow of consciousness from which derive the subjective 
act qua cogito and the objective phenomenon qua cogitatum. This absolute flow lays the ground for us 
7  Husserl, Hua3, 181.
8  Husserl, Hua19, 379.
9  Husserl, Hua19, 412.
10  Husserl, Hua3, 174; 213.
11  Husserl, Hua1, 87.
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to recollect the past or to anticipate the future in our temporal experience. In this sense, consciousness 
becomes not only the consciousness of something but also the consciousness for someone qua the ego.
Eventually, Husserl inquires into collective consciousness by expanding the solipsist account of 
intentionality. Exemplars of such inquiries are Husserl’s analysis of socio-historical groups such as 
cultural communities12 as well as his investigation13 of the transcultural life-world. He thus enriches 
the schemata of ego-cogito-cogitatum into the tripartition among the egos or the we, the collective act of 
intending, and the intended collective phenomena.
Throughout these four phases, Husserl gradually expands his conception of intentionality from 
the empirical to the transcendental, from the noesis-noema dichotomy to the ego-cogito-cogitatum 
schemata, and from individual to collective consciousness. Not only does intentionality open subjective 
consciousness(es) to its(their) objects, it further explains the way which we correlate ourselves with the 
world. At the explicative level, this correlation yields Husserl’s conception of transcendental idealism 
that first defines the condition for the possibility of phenomena to appear in consciousness and then 
serves as the refutation to what Husserl calls naturalism.  
Husserl’s critique of naturalism can be viewed as a concern for objective knowledge – how can 
objectivity be ensured in subjective consciousness. What Husserl refers to as naturalism is what we call 
today the reductionist worldview that distorts objectivity in a specific way. In the naturalistic worldview, 
scientists and philosophers presume objectivity to be free from subjective interference. This polarization 
between objectivity and subjectivity has ipso facto driven intellectuals to treat mind and the world as two 
separate entities. On the one hand, there is a material world that is pre-given and mind-independent, 
and, on the other, mind becomes the unity of psychological activities.14 The former facilitates the rise of 
physicalism which reduces the world into contingent material realities whereas the latter encourages the 
emergence of psychologism which simplifies mind into the sum-total of contingent psychical realities. 
Physicalism and psychologism constitute the two facets of this reductionistic naturalism, the defining 
feature of which is the mind-world dichotomy.15 Such dualistic reductionism, or naturalism in Husserl’s 
terms, not only distorts objectivity but also problematizes subjectivity insofar as the disconnection of 
human mind to the world, as Husserl expounds later in the Crisis, provokes an existential crisis16- if the 
objectively real world becomes separate from and irrelevant to the subjective mind, how can humans 
meaningfully relate themselves to the world? 
To prevent us from falling back to naturalism, Husserl devises the epoché. Before the epoché, things 
exist in the psycho-physical natural order. “Nothing else but the natural world is seen”.17 Through the 
epoché, the natural existence of the world is suspended. Our judgments and presumptions about the 
natural world are also neutralized. Thus, after the epoché, consciousness becomes a residuum of the 
intending act and its intended object which appears as a phenomenon. Husserl refers to such post-epoché 
consciousness as the pure consciousness. In our pure consciousness, the world appears as an intelligible 
phenomenon for the subject.18 When I enact the epoché, I dwell back to our pure consciousness and 
put aside all my presumptions about the natural existence of objects such as eight, height, physical 
expansion, or being attracted by gravity.19 Every time I fix my eyes on an object, my intuition reaches 
out to the entire world to constitute an intelligible background for me. When my focus changes, the 
background dissembles and reassembles accordingly to make the intentional object distinguishably 
appear in my consciousness. For instance, when I am working in my room and focusing on my reading, 
the maple tree with yellow and red leaves outside my window immerses itself as an integral part of 
the background. Then, I become tired. I look outside my windows at the tree. At that moment, the 
12  Husserl, Hua27, 54.
13  Husserl, Hua6, 258.
14  Husserl, Hua3, 8.
15  Husserl, Hua6, 61.
16  Husserl, Hua6, 8.
17  Husserl, Hua3, 68.
18  Husserl, Hua3, 68.
19  Husserl, Hua3, 188.
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tree surfaces from the background and the background alters itself in this new scenario to make the 
maple tree stand out. This maple tree never vanishes. The data I have about the tree remain the same. 
Yet, the way in which this tree appears in my consciousness becomes different in these two scenarios. 
Simultaneously, the sense bestowed on the appearance of the maple tree in my pure consciousness 
equally varies from one scenario to another.
This example demonstrates the way in which objectivity for Husserl, consequently, is not mind-
independent. Through intuition, we build up intentionality between the intended phenomenon (noema/
cogitatum) and the intending act (noesis/cogito). Without subjective acts, objects can never appear as 
phenomena in our consciousness. Objectivity thus is secured by subjectivity. When an object appears as 
a phenomenon, there has been a sense that is bestowed on the appearance as such. The intuitive sense 
becomes the ground for the validity of concepts or meaning-intentions. This sense of the intentioned 
phenomenon is what Husserl calls essence. 
The way in which the world can be correlated with our consciousness, or, in short, how intentional 
consciousness is possible, entails Husserl’s conception of transcendental idealism. As per Husserl, 
subjectivity is transcendentally ideal insofar as subjectivity serves as the condition for the possibility 
of phenomena. Even though subjectivity cannot exhaust the natural existence of reality, it determines 
the specific way and the distinct sense for objects to appear in pure consciousness. This determination 
alludes to the meaningful correlation between objective reality and subjective ideality. In this sense, 
Husserl ipso facto distances himself from both metaphysical idealists who proclaim ideality to be 
exhaustive of reality and reductionist scientists such as Galileo for whom the world is mind-independent. 
What Husserl endorses is a transcendental idealism which indicates the way in which mind makes the 
world meaningful through the mind-world connection. 
Given that naturalism is Husserl’s prime concern, he confines his investigations in transcendental 
idealism in order to challenge naturalism. He is confident that transcendental phenomenology can 
cure the existential crisis insofar as it enables humans to relate themselves to the world meaningfully. 
Husserl thus had not in his lifetime fully developed the possibility of a phenomenology of religion. 
Nevertheless, later phenomenologists such as Edith Stein (1891-1942) and Michel Henry (1922-2002) 
elaborate this latent possibility by following Husserl’s phenomenological approach. 
3  The Yogācāra description of consciousness and its intentional 
structure  
While Husserl considers the existential crisis in Europe as a product of modern naturalism, Yogācārins, 
from the 600s, conceive of such crisis (also known as suffering) as a birthmark of life. Yogācārins’ 
conception of existential crisis alludes to their fidelity to the Buddha’s teaching. Historically, the 
Buddha or Siddhārtha Gautama (c. 500s BCE) sympathized with all beings, so he preached the way 
of overcoming suffering through the wisdom of emptiness and the non-egoistic compassion. Later 
Buddhist clergy inaugurated their own approach to elaborate the Buddha’s teaching. 
    Yogācārins are known for using their investigation of human consciousness to serve their religious 
goal of realizing emptiness and compassion. After depicting how consciousness transforms itself at 
the descriptive level, Yogācārins account for how this transformation gives rise to both attachments 
and liberation at the explicative level. To remove attachments and to awake wisdom and compassion, 
Yogācārins prescribe norms for religious practices and moral actions. At the prescriptive level, these 
practices, sometimes quite challenging, not only test but will also reinforce devotees’ religious fidelity. 
These three levels, namely, the descriptive, the explicative, and the prescriptive, constitute the Buddhist 
phenomenology in the Yogācāra sense. 
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To indicate this three-level approach, I focus on the account of self-consciousness provided by Chinese 
Yogācārins.20 I begin by introducing Yogācārins’ description of intentional consciousness in the current 
section. Then, I clarify how this description allows Yogācārins to account for self-attachments in the next 
two sections and to necessitate religious practices at the prescriptive level in the last part. 
According to Chengweishilun (Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi, 成唯識論, henceforth the Siddhi) and Kuiji’s 
commentary, Yogācārins articulate four theories to explain the way in which consciousness transforms 
itself to the phenomenon when an object appears and the act that can perceive such a phenomenon. Since 
all these theories accentuate the relation between the act and the phenomenon, they are in parallel to 
Husserl’s conception of intentionality. 
The first account is inaugurated by Sthiramati (c. 500s) who defines consciousness as svasaṃvitti (自
證). As per Sthiramati, consciousness is that which continuously transforms itself. Albeit transformation 
brings about mental acts and phenomena, these acts and phenomena are derivative, illusory, and non-
existing. It is only the ceaselessly transforming consciousness that has existence. Kuiji coins the term 
“onefold structure (一分說)” to define Sthiramati’s theory.21 
Nanda (c. 500s) contends that consciousness must have an object to intend to (T31N1585, P10a26). 
He thus dichotomizes self-consciousness into the transforming act and the transformed phenomenon 
produced by the act.22 The act is commonly referred to as darśana-bhāga (the seeing part), the phenomenon 
as nimitta-bhāga (the seen part). Nanda’s view thus represents the second demarcation of intentional 
consciousness, the twofold structure (二分說). Between Nanda’s twofold structure and Husserl’s noesis-
noema dichotomy, a parallel can be drawn.
Nanda’s twofold structure, scrutinized by later Yogācārins like Dinnāga (c. 500s), cannot fully resolve 
the problem of recollection. If consciousness encompasses only the seeing act and the seen phenomenon, 
how can we recollect mental events that have passed?23 To remedy the issue of recollection, Dinnāga 
reintroduces svasaṃvitti which serves as the underlying flow from which all conscious acts arise and 
perish. This results in his threefold structure (三分說) – consciousness continuously flows as the underlying 
process qua svasaṃvitti-bhāga (自證分) which gives rise to the seeing act qua darśana-bhāga and the seen 
phenomenon qua nimitta-bhāga. Here, we can discern a similarity between Dinnāga’s threefold structure 
and Husserl’s ego-cogito-cogitatum. 
20  Here, I would like to provide a short history of Chinese Yogācāra. This Buddhist doctrine has been brought to China ever 
since the Northern-Southern Dynasty period (420-589). Back then, Yogācāra Buddhism was represented by two teachings, the 
“Samgraha” or “Shelun攝論” in the north initiated by Paramārtha (499-569), and the “Dilun地論” (Daśabhūmikā) in the south 
founded by Bodhiruci (arriving in China in 508). These teachings were named after the major Buddhist texts they revered, the 
Mahāyānasamgraha and Daśabhūmika. Due to socio-historical and sectarian issues, Shelun and Dilun found their readings of 
Yogācāra incompatible with each other. Debates constantly occurred among clerics of these two teachings on the nature of the 
eighth and seventh consciousness, on the proper understanding of consciousness-only, and on the definition of Buddha nature. 
Facing the confrontation of these two teachings, Xuanzang (602-663) was convinced that the Buddha’s true teaching had not yet 
been transmitted to China. He thus determined to travel to India to study Buddhism. After completing his study in Nalānda temple, 
Xuanzang returned to China in 645. He tried to promote what he learned in India to the Chinese by translating countless Buddhist 
texts. Translation is always self-reflexive. In Xuanzang’s case, he was not only passively receiving the theories from Indian 
Yogācāra masters but also creatively imbueing in his translation his own understanding of the Yogācāra doctrine of consciousness. 
His new translation thus marked the divide between early Yogācāra in China, namely, Samgraha and Daśabhūmikā, and later 
Yogācāra represented by Xuanzang’s Dharmalakṣaṇa School (法相宗). Supported by the Emperor, the Dharmalakṣaṇa School 
thrived in the late 600s and developed its own lineage. Early Yogācāra however was gradually absorbed by the Huayan School 
of Buddhism. After the Great Prosecution of Buddhism in the 800s, Chinese Yogācāra declined. Fortunately, Xuazang and Kuiji 
recruited several Japanese and Korean disciples so that Chinese Yogācāra, its teaching and scriptures, survived inside Japanese 
monasteries till today, among them Kōfuki-ji. In the late 1800s, Yang Wenhui (1837-1911), with the help of his friend Nanjō Bunyū 
(1849-1927), brought back to China several Yogācāra texts together with many other scriptures that had been long lost. These texts 
laid the foundation for the revival of Buddhism in modern China. During this revival, numerous remarkable Buddhist scholars and 
scholar monks emerged, among them Lü Cheng (1896-1989) and Taixu (1890-1947). Lü, after comparing Buddhist texts in various 
languages, argued that the divide between early and later Yogācāra was more than a difference in translation. Rather, this divide 
represented fundamental different understandings of consciousnesses inside the Yogācāra school both in India and in China (Lü, 
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Nevertheless, Dinnāga’s disciple Dharmapāla (c. 550s) poses the question about the knowability of the 
underlying process, svasaṃvitti-bhāga. Dharmapāla contends that all consciousness is immediately aware 
of its own movement and then there should be a fourth part called “awareness of self-consciousness” or 
the svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga (證自證分). As per Dharmapāla, whenever consciousness transforms itself, 
we are immediately aware of such transformation. This fourfold structure of svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga, 
svasaṃvitti, darśana-bhāga, and nimitta-bhāga is that which Xuanzang and his disciples support. 
Unlike Husserl or any modern philosophers who demarcate sensation and intuition from 
conceptualization, Yogācārins metaphorize these cognitive faculties as eight different types of 
consciousness. The first five consciousnesses pertain to our five senses that arise and perish from time to 
time. These senses, more often than not, are discontinuous. Thus, to produce knowledge, these five senses 
must rely on the sixth consciousness or the mind that is capable of synthesizing and conceptualizing all 
sense data. Nevertheless, even the mind does not endure throughout time. There are times when we lose the 
sixth consciousness in a comatose state or in deep sleep. 
The temporary loss of the sixth consciousness does not affect the continuous flow of our experience. 
When a patient wakes up from a coma or when we are awakened from deep sleep, we lose neither our 
entire life experience nor our cognitive capacity. Thus, Yogācārins presume that there must be some more 
underlying conditions that sustain the function of the first six consciousnesses. To secure the functionality 
of the sixth consciousness or mind, Yogācārins affirm the existence of the seventh consciousness called 
manas that ceaselessly transform throughout time. 
All these seven consciousnesses further depend on the eighth consciousness, ālaya. To describe ālaya, the 
Yogācārins adopt a figurative terminology. They compare the eighth consciousness to the storehouse of seeds 
(bījā). The image of the seed epitomizes what we call in modern language the idea of possibility. A seed can grow 
up into a plant when it lives in proper conditions such as climate, nutrition, and cultivation. Yet, a seed can also 
remain in its nascent state without being able to grow up. Analogically, our experience of certain events persists 
as a possibility. When all the conditions are fulfilled, we can realize such experience. Yet, this possibility might 
also stay latent, never able to come into being. By formulating ālaya as the storehouse of seeds, Yogācārins 
ipso facto indicate that this eighth consciousness serves as the condition for all the possibilities of experiences 
throughout endless time. From this conception of ālaya, I infer the transcendental argument that is an integral 
part of the explicative level of the Buddhist phenomenology in the Yogācāra sense. 
Hence, for later Yogācārins, not only can all these consciousnesses transform themselves into darśana-
bhāga and nimitta-bhāga, but each consciousness is also reflexively aware of its own transformation. Such 
an architectonic of consciousness allows later Yogācārins to account for the way in which this self-aware 
transformation raises an open possibility both for forming and removing attachments. While the dual 
role of transformation remains nascent in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, it becomes a crucial 
constituent in Yogācāra’s Buddhist phenomenology.  
4  The Yogācāra explication of self-attaching and self-emptying
In our everyday life, we have a very natural way of perceiving our ‘self’. Sometimes we express it in language 
by uttering propositions such as “I am a coffee person”, “I don’t like grocery shopping”, or “I’m into cats, 
not dogs”. Or, we perform certain kind of actions without keeping in mind the “I”-proposition. This is 
always the case when I wake up every day at seven o’clock in the morning, make my coffee, feed my cats, 
and go to work. We have inhabited this lifestyle so deeply that we almost forget the implicit “I” narrative. I 
am the maker of my life story, so I must possess an immutable identity qua the “I”. 
Buddhists categorize our view of the immutable “I” as Essentialistic24 to which they attribute the 
cause of suffering. In Buddhist terminology, this Essential nature of things to be sui generis, permanent, 
24  To distinguish the Buddhist notion of svabhāva from Husserl’s conception of essence, I decided to translate svabhāva into 
Essence with the capital E. For Husserl, as explained earlier, essence is the ideal sense constituted by subjective ideality. Since 
essence can be constituted, it is not the svabhāva or Essence contested by Buddhists. 
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and immutable is called svabhāva (自性). Once we condition ourselves to this svabhāvic view of ego, we 
naturally attach to this fixed self-identity. Attachment subsequently leads to suffering. I suffer when I, a 
coffee person, cannot get my coffee in my workplace. Or, I suffer when I, who hate grocery shopping, must 
go to the supermarket. Or, I suffer when I should get up earlier at five o’clock. Suffering, thus, does not 
always have to be propositional knowledge. It could also exist just as emotions or afflictions.
The questions Yogācārins intend to answer are why most of us are inclined to presume our ego to 
be svabhāvic, how this presumption leads to attachments, and how attachments can be removed. At the 
explicative level, Xuanzang and Kuiji clarify the way in which the transformation of consciousness gives 
rise to the possibility of forming and removing self-attachments. In what follows, I will focus on the self-
attachment which has been further classified by Xuanzang and Kuiji into the embodied self-attachment 
(俱身我執, sahaja-ātmangrāha) and the discriminative self-attachment (分別我執, vikalpita-ātmangrāha).25 
The first type of self-attachment is characterized as “embodied” insofar as it accompanies us so long 
as consciousness transforms itself in our bodily experience. As per Xuanzang and Kuiji, in our experience, 
the eighth consciousness ālaya turns itself into the subjective act qua darśana-bhāga and the phenomenon 
or nimitta-bhāga.26 Likewise, our bodily experience is possible because ālaya transforms itself into a lived 
body in the subject sense and a corporeal body in an objective sense. When I am cooking, I hold the ladle, 
constantly stirring the soup. By ‘I’, I’m de facto referring to my body as the subject of these actions of 
cooking, holding, and stirring. Suddenly, I feel the pain from my thumb. I look down, realizing that I cut 
myself earlier when chopping the meat. In my recollection, I perceive my body as something objective. For 
Yogācārins, our experience of our subjective and objective body is grounded in the incessant transformation 
of ālaya. To illustrate such perpetual transformation, Yogācārins compare ālaya to the waterfall, namely, 
the dynamic flow throughout our entire experience.27 In this depiction of ālaya as the condition for the 
possibility of bodily experience, we again infer Yogācārins’ transcendental argument. 
For most sentient beings including humans, we are inclined to misperceive this perpetual transformation 
of ālaya. This misbelief subsequently gives rise to the embodied self-attachment. Yogācārins attribute the 
cause of this embodied self-attachment to the sixth and the seventh consciousnesses. Manas, the seventh 
consciousness, targets the subjective body transformed from ālaya and falsely imagines this subjective 
body as a stable identity.28 The six consciousness, while receiving data from the first five senses about the 
objective body transformed from ālaya, tends to conceptualize the objective body into svabhāva.29 After 
miscomprehending ālaya’s perpetual transformation as a stable self-identity, we become permanently 
attached to our ego. 
This embodied self-attachment captured by Yogācārins amounts to our sense of self-sustainment. Since 
I am the maker of my own life story, I can and must maintain this narrative. This sense of self-sustainment 
explains how we have inhabited in our self-centered life story. When I get up every day to make my coffee, 
to feed my cat, to dress myself, and to go to work, I am self-reflexively aware of my life, too unique to 
be experienced by others. Habitual feelings creep into our experience, further cultivating and reinforcing 
my embodied self-attachments. Yogācārins compare this cultivation to perfuming – while ālaya stores the 
seeds for the experience of self-attachments, this seed will not grow up unless it has been perfumed or 
nourished by our delusion of the self. 
From the embodied self-attachment, the second self-attachment, namely the discriminative self-
attachment, derives. After confirming the immutable self-identity in bodily experience, we continue to 
secure our egocentric life-story by differentiating ourselves from others. The criteria of differentiating can 
be either material such as height or weight, or, ideological like cultural, social class, or just fashion taste.30 
When I proclaim to be a MacBook person, I deliberately identify myself with MacBook lovers, distinguishing 
25  T31N1585, P2a10.
26  Ālaya can transform into three types of objective phenomena: the seeds or all the possibilities of experiences, our corporeal 
body, and the external world (T31N1585, P10a13-14).
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myself from others such as Samsung or Thinkpad users. The way in which I distinguish myself from others 
alludes to the second type of self-attachment, the discriminative self-attachment. For Yogācārins, only the 
sixth consciousness is capable of establishing criteria to distinguish ourselves from others.31 
Unlike early Yogācārins, Xuanzang and Kuiji do not ascribe the cause of attachment to the transformation 
of consciousness per se.32 All consciousnesses transform. That is how consciousnesses are. What eventually 
leads to that svabhāvic worldview is the misunderstanding of this transformation. As previously mentioned, 
the sixth and the seventh consciousnesses are both capable of falsely imagining ālaya as a fixed identity.33 
This imagination further encourages us to polarize our egos with others and keeps reinforcing such self-
identify throughout social interactions. Xuanzang compares our continuous reinforcement or cultivation 
to the perfuming of the seeds of self-attachments in the eighth consciousness. Perfuming thus nourishes 
attachments that eventually pollute consciousnesses.   
In the meantime, the transformation of all consciousnesses also preserves the possibility for removing 
attachments. Two factors contribute to this possibility. First, all consciousnesses are aware of their own 
transformation into the act of seeing or darśana-bhāga and the seen phenomenon or nimitta-bhāga. For 
instance, manas is self-aware of the entire process when manas falsely imagines the subjective body 
transformed from ālaya into a svabhāvic entity. Mutatis mutandis, the six consciousness possesses the self-
awareness of its misperception of the objective body transformed by ālaya. Now that consciousness is self-
aware, we can know how false imaginations arise. This knowledge makes it possible for us to avoid false 
imagination, to remove attachments, and to purify consciousness. Yet, as previously mentioned, the first 
six consciousnesses are discontinuous. If so, how can we purify the consciousnesses when they are not in 
function? How can we purify previously polluted consciousnesses? These questions lead us to the second 
factor, the perpetually transforming ālaya. Given that ālaya serves as the condition for the possibility 
of all experiences throughout time, it stores all past events and ensures the re-rising of discontinuous 
consciousnesses. Consequently, even when the first six consciousnesses are not functioning, even when 
some events have passed away, the incessant transformation of ālaya still allows us to purify the polluted 
consciousnesses. In short, given that consciousnesses are all self-aware, what can be polluted by us can also 
be purified by us; due to the perpetuity of ālaya, it is never too late for us to embark on such purification.
To purify consciousnesses, Yogācārins establish norms for religious practices and moral actions. Once 
devotees realize that things are empty of any svabhāvic nature, they will comprehend the interdependence 
between the self and others. This comprehension further evokes their non-egoistic compassion for all 
sentient beings. By conducting altruistic deeds, devotees reversely cultivate and reinforce their realization 
of emptiness. As Xuanzang documents in the Siddhi, the purified seventh consciousness becomes the 
wisdom of equality (平等性智) through which we see ourselves as equals to other beings. Likewise, the 
purified sixth consciousness turns into the wisdom of wondrous observation (妙觀察智) which enables us 
to view the interdependence between humans and everything else in the external world. 
5  The Yogācāra explication of emptiness and its metaphysical 
implications 
As analyzed in the previous section, to remove self-attachments, Yogācārins argue for self-emptying. What 
is this experience of self-emptying? How can we describe this worldview in which we realize emptiness? 
These questions propel us to explicate the meaning of emptiness and its metaphysical implications. 
This elucidation allows me to clarify the Yogācāra worldview which I term transcendental idealism 
which correlates subjective ideality with objectivity reality. This clarification further contests the current 
interpretation of Yogācāra philosophy and then prepares me to argue for the importance of subjectivity or 
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A typical answer to those questions is to equate emptiness with a void. Emptiness thus amounts to the 
doctrine in which nothing exists. Yet, if the self does not exist at all, who is going to conduct all the religious 
performance and who is going to realize emptiness and compassion? Both Xuanzang and Kuiji criticize the 
equation of emptiness with a void. As Kuiji explains, emptiness (śūnyatā) differs from empty (śūnya) because 
the affix “-ness” or “-tā” in Sanskrit denotes a very positive understanding of the ultimate nature of things 
in the cosmos.34 Kuiji continues to define emptiness as the nature of things being empty from svabhāva.35 
As Xuanzang documents in the Siddhi, after we remove attachments, the transformation of consciousness 
continues although we no longer falsely imagine such transformation as svabhāvic.36 This experience of 
emptiness thus is to embrace the continuous arising and perishing of events, to be interdependent with 
each other, and to live life as it is. Such experience parallels to what Husserl proclaims, ‘back to the things 
themselves’ and ‘seeing them as they really are’.  
To clarify the metaphysical implication of the experience of emptiness as such, I turn to the three-
nature framework by which Yogācārins37 portray the process from recognizing how we false imagine 
the transformation of consciousness through the falsely imagining nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), to 
understanding the transformation of consciousness through the all-dependent nature (paratantra-
svabhāva), and eventually to realizing emptiness through the ultimate nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). 
Later Yogācārins, such as Dharmapāla and Xuanzang, do not negate the existence of transformed 
phenomena. For them, what can be perceived must have a distinct kind of existence, even though such 
existence is not ultimately real. In Chinese, Xuanzang refers to such existence of transformed phenomena 
as seemingly real (虛實) or nominally existing (假有, prajñāptisat).38 For instance, the subjective body and 
objective body which we falsely imagine to be svabhāvic in our embodied self-attachment or discriminative 
self-attachment have nominal existence.39 However, our seventh and sixth consciousnesses misperceive 
this nominal existence to be the svabhāva. Thus, it is not the transformation of consciousness, not the 
nominal existence of these transformed phenomena, but the misconception of transformation that 
causes attachment. In this way, to realize the ultimate empty nature of things does not involve nullifying 
transformation but requires us to refrain from misconception. Now that transformation is not to be nullified, 
the second all-dependent nature also has its specific way of existing.
What is the metaphysical implication delivered by later Yogācārins through their articulation of 
emptiness and the three-nature framework? First, regarding objective reality, later Yogācārins refuse to 
generalize such existence as the svabhāva even though they affirm the momentary existence of transformed 
phenomena. Hence, for them, reality is not exhausted by consciousness. Nor is reality mind-independent 
insofar as the perception of reality requires consciousness. Husserl expresses a similar view of reality. 
If we can misperceive reality, we can also correct this misconception, or in Yogācāra terms, purify this 
misconception. 
To encourage devotees to practice, Yogācārins do not negate the existence of subjectivity. Rather, they 
affirm the existence of subjectivity or agency (the latter being more practical), even though this subjectivity 




37  While all Yogācārins endorse this three-nature theory, the way in which it has been interpreted in early Yogācāra differs from 
that in later Yogācāra. Early Yogācārins such as Nanda or Sthiramati, while focusing on the transformative act of consciousness, 
conceive of transformed phenomena to be generative and thus to have no existence (T31N1604, P613b14-16). Since all objective 
phenomena are transformed by consciousness, consciousness exhausts objective reality. In modern philosophical language, 
early Yogācāra embraces a metaphysical idealism. Due to this metaphysical view, early Yogācārins attribute attachments to the 
transformation of consciousness per se – transformation gives rise to duality and duality further empowers attachments. Since 
all consciousnesses transform, they all can dichotomize and can falsely imagine. Since what is transformed from consciousness 
does not exist, the transformation as such likewise does not have real existence. Thus, for early Yogācārins, the second nature 
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the possibility for us to remove attachment is secured by both the self-awareness of consciousnesses and 
the perpetual functioning ālaya. What characterizes this subjectivity or agency, for which both polluting 
and purifying consciousnesses is possible, is ideality.
Thus, at an explicative level, later Yogācārins have clarified the correlation between subjective ideality 
and objective reality: on the one hand, objective reality is neither exhausted by consciousness nor mind-
independent, and on the other, subjective ideality is not a higher identity or a substance. Through the 
transformation of consciousness, subjectivity ideality determines the way in which reality appears as a 
phenomenon with its distinct sense. Sometimes, such determination nourishes false imagination and then 
attachments. Yet, this determination also reveals the way for us to remove attachments and to go back to 
the things themselves. Husserl coins this subject-object correlativism as transcendental idealism. Thus, 
Yogācārins are neither scientists of mind nor nihilists who renounce the world. Rather, Yogācārins are 
believers of the Buddha’s teaching of emptiness. They perform religious actions through which they can 
eventually realize emptiness and compassion. In this sense, transcendental idealism for later Yogācārins 
is not only a worldview but also a norm, not only an explication of what we see but also a prescription of 
what we should do. 
6  The Yogācāra prescriptions for self-emptying and its religious 
performances 
In the Yogācāra doctrine of consciousness, the experience of emptiness is gradually realized through 
performing various religious practices. At the prescriptive level, Xuanzang articulates five phases for 
devotees to eventually realize emptiness and compassion. He depicts in great detail about the experience 
of each phase known as the path (位，mārga).40 Unlike Yogācārins, Husserl does not concern himself 
with religious practices. After formulating transcendental idealism to secure objectivity in subjective 
mind, Husserl accomplishes his project. Contrariwise, for Yogācārins, to demonstrate their fidelity to the 
Buddha’s teaching, they continue to prescribe rules for devotees to realize emptiness in understanding 
and in practice. This examination of the prescriptive level, I contend, will demonstrate the importance of 
agency in the process from self-attaching to self-emptying. Agency further illustrates the crucial role of faith 
in Buddhism. 
In the first path known as the path of accumulation (資糧位, saṃbhāra-mārga), devotees make the 
determination to follow the Bodhisattva’s way, to realize emptiness and compassion.41 Devotees in this path 
are accumulating energy or karmic grain by carrying out altruistic deeds and familiarizing themselves with 
the wisdom of emptiness.42 Though devotees start the practice of meditation and insight (止觀, śamatha-
vipaśyanā),43 they are incapable of purifying false imagination from consciousness, thus unable to remove 
attachments such as the embodied self-attachment or the discriminative self-attachment. Nevertheless, 
these deeds fortify devotees’ fidelity to the Buddha’s teaching, preparing them for the next phase of 
practice.44 
The karmic energy enables devotees to enter the second path called the path of preparation (加行
位, prayoga-mārga)45 at which devotees will scrutinize the nature of conceptualization in meditation and 
insight.46 They will understand that our svabhāvic perception of the self or any other object in the cosmos is 
incorrect.47 However, as per Xuanzang, intellectual speculation can only remove discriminative attachments 
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the second path does not bring a follower the ultimate realization of emptiness.48 Devotees shall proceed to 
the third path of seeing (見道位, darśana-mārga). 
At the third path of seeing, emptiness for devotees is no longer a subject matter for speculation but an 
underlying principle of life.49 By practicing a more profound type of meditation, devotees will see thing as 
they really are, as different yet interdependent.50 Even though consciousness still transforms itself, devotees 
no longer treat transformation through a clear-cut category but become one with the transformation in each 
moment of life.51 Xuanzang describes this state as “being born in Maitreya’s home and living in a delightful 
land”.52 This analogy shows how devotees become bodhisattva themselves after following the path. Till 
then, every moment on earth for these devotees is free from mental affliction and suffering, every moment 
being like the most desirable in the delightful land. They are not only awake from their egocentric lives 
but also see others as their equals. It is in this third path that the sixth and the seventh consciousnesses 
eventually purify themselves from the embodied attachments and discriminative attachments. The sixth 
consciousness evolves (轉依, āśraya-parivṛtti) into the wisdom of wondrous observation53, the seventh 
consciousness into the wisdom of equality.54
In the fourth path of refinement (修習位, bhāvanā-mārga), religious performances for devotees become 
increasingly more altruistic.55 While continuing to refine their own realization of emptiness, devotees are 
motivated to conduct the ten perfections of actions (勝行, pāramitā) to benefit and help others.56 These 
deeds reversely purify their consciousness. 
When devotees purify all consciousnesses, they proceed to the last path, the ultimate level (究竟位, 
aśaikṣā-mārga).57 Devotees eventually turn all polluted consciousness into the pure wisdom.58 Aside from 
the aforementioned purified sixth consciousness or the wisdom of wondrous observation and the purified 
seventh consciousness called the wisdom of equality, the eighth consciousness ālaya evolves itself into 
the wisdom of perfection (大圓鏡智),59 the first five consciousnesses into the wisdom of accomplishment 
(成所作智).60 These four kinds of wisdom, namely, the wisdom of perfection, the wisdom of equality, the 
wisdom of wondrous observation, and the wisdom of accomplishment, not only bring about the awakening 
of devotees but also benefit all sentient beings by actualizing the pure dharma realm.61 Āśraya-parivṛtti (轉
依) or the evolution of basis thus indicates the way in which devotees turn the polluted world into a pure 
one. This implication alludes to, I conjecture, the modern concept of ‘Pure Land on the earth’ in humanistic 
Buddhism.     
Xuanzang and other Yogācārins contend that devotees need various kalpas to travel through each 
path. In the Buddhist context, each kalpa lasts for four billion years. This time span is beyond human 
imagination. Kalpa, I suggest, can be understood as an artistic way of highlighting the ideal existence of a 
purified dharma realm (which can become real in the future if devotees strive for realizing it). By stressing 
the long process of awakening emptiness and compassion, Yogācāra clergy do not purport to intimidate 
devotees. Rather, they remind devotees of the importance of faith and persistence when embarking on the 
arduous journey towards awakening. The stress of faith for devotees in their practice of realizing emptiness 
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7  Conclusion 
Since Husserl is concerned about the crisis of meaning in modern Europe, he stops his investigation of 
consciousness at transcendental phenomenology, through which he secures objective meaning with 
subjective consciousness. Husserl is thus confident that transcendental idealism can remedy naturalism. 
He further implies that transcendental phenomenology can establish a meaningful worldview for modern 
humans. For Yogācārins, such meaning stems from our understanding of objects that appear as phenomena 
for us but also from our engagement with these objects in everyday life. To put it differently, a meaningful 
life is not only viewed by us but also lived by us. Yogācārins, who cherish their distinct motive for examining 
human consciousness, stress the performative side of transcendental idealism and the role of faith in 
performances. 
Nevertheless, though coming from completely different cultural-historical contexts, why do both 
Husserl and Yogācārins endorse a very similar worldview, known as transcendental idealism in modern 
terms? It would be inappropriate to assert that Yogācārins anticipate Husserl’s phenomenology or to assume 
that Husserl is influenced by Yogācārins. While Yogācārins are not precursors of Husserl’s phenomenology, 
Husserl did not, at least according to currently available resources, read any Yogācāra texts. 
I propose understanding this mutual interest in the ultimate nature of consciousness as a shared 
concern for existence – how consciousness shows the correlation between mind and the world so much 
so that we can find a way of navigating life and coping with an existential crisis like suffering. Through 
their investigation, they discover the way in which consciousness correlates the subjective mind with the 
objective world. As Husserl argues, we ensure objectivity through subjectivity. It is through consciousness 
that humans can reconnect themselves meaningfully with the world. Yogācārins further indicate that 
subjectivity gives us an open possibility. It can either obstruct objectivity by nourishing attachments or 
secure objectivity through removing attachments. This open possibility thus yields the importance of 
faithful practice through which we gradually see things as they are and realize the wisdom of emptiness 
and non-egoistic compassion. Both Husserl and Yogācārins thus insightfully pinpoint the ultimate nature 
of consciousness as the mind-world correlation. They remind us that our consciousness is not a brain in a 
vat or a ghost in the machine, not a realm that is closed off from the outside. Rather, through consciousness, 
we can go back to the things themselves and see them as they actually are. Yogācārins further expound 
the way in which faithful practice and performances will eventually enable us to realize the wisdom of 
emptiness and compassion. This prescriptive level not only demarcates Yogācāra Buddhism from Husserl’s 
phenomenology but also characterizes the religious aspect of the Buddhist phenomenology in the Yogācāra 
sense. 
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